Improving the Quality of Service (QOS) 
Introduction
A wireless mesh network (WMN) is a network consists of clients and points. Clients can be fixed like desktops and servers or movable like labtops, mobiles, and tablets. A small number of the mesh points are connected to the Internet (Internet gateways), while the rest of the mesh nodes rely on multi-hop wireless roads to have a connection with the Internet connected points [1] . The wireless mesh networks have many important applications like streaming multimedia, and video conference [2] .
The main target of wireless networks standards is to give users a seamless and secure roaming through the network. For IEEE 802.16m [3] , the presented authentication protocol is the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) due to some features, as its flexibility [4] . But, EAP has some disadvantages in the handover process, as time consuming, and losing of privacy preservation [5] . The time consuming in EAP is due to the long time operation the MS must do through each handover process. A Mobile Station (MS) has to be authenticated by the Authentication Server (AS) every hop, which is not suitable for real time applications such as video conference, and VoIP.
The paper contributes toward improve IEEE 802.11x for wireless mesh networks in terms of authentication delay. The authentication server does not need to be involved in the handover process.
In [5] , a handover authentication scheme based on ticket for IEEE 802.16m network is presented. In this scheme, the MS and BS can complete the mutual authentication without need to communicate with the AS server, thus the handoff latency is improved. The protocol proposed a method of key redistribution among neighboring BSs. After a home base station (HBS) successfully authenticates a MS through the login authentication phase, the HBS sends the first byte of the credential ticket belongs to this MS with its corresponding authentication key to its neighboring bas stations. However, this scheme doesn't give a good definition to the identity of each MS when it enters a new BS's region, which may lead to a problem during the determination of this MS, and through its authentication operation. Also, this scheme doesn't preserve a high level of MS's privacy. Because, it still sends the MS's identity to the new HBS in each handover operation. Taking this scheme as a reference, in this paper, we propose a new handover authentication protocol. The idea of the new protocol is based on key redistribution also from the HBS to the neighboring BSs. But, the new protocol guarantees a good definition to the MS when enters a new BS's region. Also, it gives a high level of privacy by not sendi ng the MS's identity. All of these benefits, without any increase in computation and communication overhead. The good level of handover can be measured by the following parameters:
1. Low latency, 2. Low packet loss, 3. Privacy protection, and 4. Universality for various networks. So, the design goals in the current paper are to satisfy most of the previous list of measuring parameters. The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work. In Section 3, the proposed handover authentication scheme is presented. Section 4 analyzes the performance of the proposed protocol. The security analysis of the presented protocol is discussed in Section 5. The verification of the proposed protocol is presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related Work
Celia and et al. in [6] divide the authentication protocols in wireless networks into three categories: a) Multi-hop authentication [7] , b) Pro-active authentication [8] , and c) Ticket-based authentication [5, 9, and 10] . Multi-hop authentication protocols require that the MS must return to the AS server each time of hop for re-authentication, which may be existed very far from the MS. This type leads to long latency. In [7] , the protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) is presented. PANA doesn't introduce a new authentication technique. It processes the EAP payload. So authentication through handover is done using multi-hop wireless technique of EAP. In the proactive type, the AS distributes the PMK (Pairwise Master Key) to the HBS neighbors'. The PMK is the necessary key for the MS and Target Base Stations (TBSs) for encrypting the upcoming messages exchanged between each other. In [8] , new proactive authentication methods are proposed. They use the Inter Access Point Protocol (IAPP) [11] . The protocol used the IAPP to pre-distribute the PMK to the HBS neighbors'. But, this protocol suffers also from the same problems that the other proactive types suffer from. Like for example, first the repetition of key distribution for each new HBS neighbors's. The base stations may be the neighbors for many times for the new HBSs. Second, it's the lake of privacy, because the user's location is cleared to all neighbor base stations'. So the protocol suffers from traffic analysis attack. The proposed protocol preserves the privacy to prevent traffic analysis attack.
A Ticket-based authentication type is considered a good improvement for the multi-hop type specially in case of moving in large area as will be detailed late r. A MS will get the necessary tickets to enter the new expected base station regions' after the MS is successfully authenticated by the AS server. In [9] , a new design based on ticket is presented. The design uses symmetric key algorithms, and doesn't require any modification in the IEEE 802.1x authentication architecture. The MS and the BS authenticate each other without involving of a third party. It uses the cooperation feature between routers in the mesh network. It means that the MS can still be connected to its previous HBS by using the new TBS as a relay after handover [9] . So, the MS doesn't need to make a full authentication with the new TBS [9] . In this protocol, the AS uses the identities and the master keys between the AS server and the neighbor base stations to generate handoff tickets for the MS. The MS stores these tickets for later use. But, almost of these dedicated base stations generate tickets may be not used later. The MS may use only one of them. This is determined according to its direction, which isn't clear. Also, this scheme doesn't satisfy user privacy. In [10] , another handover authentication scheme based on ticket is proposed. It proposes using a pseudonym in the initial authentication phase. Then, it changes the MS's pseudonym in the handover phase. But, this protocol has a drawback. The base station must make a symmetric decryption operation to can differentiate between the false and correct messages, which can be solved by a simple MAC operation as in the proposed protocol in this paper. Symmetric decryption operation will consume power more than the simple MAC function.
All the previous presented techniques can be divided according to the moving area of the MS into two different types, the global handoff and the local handoff.
Local handoff
In this type, the MS doesn't move in a very wide area. It moves inside a limited region. So, the base stations that the MS transfers between them are expected. In this type, the proactive authentication protocols are the recommended one, bec ause the MS will have got a very fast authentication process. The key re -distribution in this type is between the HBS and its neighbors. Nearly, one hop away.
Global handoff
The global handoff means the transferring of mobile stations between very far base stations like in high ways; which often occurs with high speeds. The mobile user moves outside the expected region. In this case, the proactive authentication scheme is not suitable, because the pre-distribution of the PMK to the neighbors of the HBS leads to additional traffic overhead inside the network [6] . Also, this long distance between the AS and the target base stations may lead to late in receiving of the PMK to them [6] . So, in this type, the ticket-based authentication protocols are the recommended type. In this paper, a new hybrid technique uses both proactive authentication type, and ticket authentication type is proposed. The proposed scheme is presented in the following section.
Proposed Handover Authentication Scheme
In this section, the fast handover mechanism is proposed. The proposed model is constructed of two phases as shown in Fig.1 . They are the initial authentication phase, and the handover authentication phase. The proposed scheme follows the key hierarchical structure which is presented in IEEE 80211i [12] .
Initial Authentication Phase
The MS when access the IEEE 802.16m network, it performs the EAP authentication. We denote the home base station (the current base station), HBS, while the handover target base stations, TBSs. We describe the steps of this phase as follows.
After the MS finished the EAP authentication with the AS, the MS and the
AS generate a master key MK, and the HBS and the AS share a Pairwise master key (PMK) derived from MK. Using the PMK, some keys are derived, and a secure channel is established between the AS and the MS. 2. The MS gets a pseudo random number P 0 , and a random number from the AS server through the secured channel connection. When the MS enters the first home base station region (HBS1), the MS will choose a random number , and sends the first message (MSG#1) to HBS1 containing , and . So, the first message (MSG#1) is:
Once receiving MSG#1, HBS1 sends to the AS server to know the corresponding P 0 of this MS. The AS server sends the P 0 key of the MS to HBS1. After the HBS1 knows the corresponding P 0 of this MS, it can verify the MAC value. If the MAC value is valid, HBS1 creates a ticket T 0 MS for the MS's future handover authentication, which is described as follows:  HBS1 computes a temporary handover mobile key, THMK 0 by Equation (2).
(2) : is the group key. This key is known to all base stations and the AS.
must be updated after a suitable certain period of time by the AS, and it is distributed again to the base stations through the secure channel connection between the AS and the base stations.
 HBS1 computes the hash function of using Equation 3 to get . (3)  HBS1 generates a credential ticket by Equation (4).
Where; h: is the number of hops to the MS starting from the AS until the arrival to the current HBS. In this case, h=1. The benefit of adding h in the MS's ticket is to satisfy the non_repudiation property, as will be declared in Subsec. (5-4) . The credential ticket of MS stores information of the MS, and ticket expiry date as follows: T exp : includes the expiration time, and the time stamp of this message. The expiration time is important to check the validity of this ticket, and the time stamp is important to prevent the replay attack. The proposed protocol in [5] lacks the time stamp, which makes the proposed scheme susceptible to replay attack. Then, HBS1 chooses a random number , and finally, HBS1 sends the second message (MSG#2) to MS that includes , , and and their MAC value (using the P 0 key to generate the MAC function). The Second message (MSG#2) is:
Upon receiving the MSG#2 from HBS1, MS verifies that the in the MSG#2 matches the value provided by itself in the MSG#1. If the two values of the are not matched, the MS will ignore MSG#2. Otherwise, the MS verifies the MAC value using the P 0 key. If the MAC value is verified, MS knows it has the same session P 0 key. Then MS sends the third message (MSG#3) to HBS1. MSG#3 includes , , and their MAC value to HBS1. The Third message (MSG#3) is:
After receiving MSG#3, HBS1 compares the in the MSG#3 with the value provided by itself in the MSG#2. If the two values are not matched, HBS1 will not authenticate MS. If the two values are equal, the MS will be authenticated.
Figure 1. Proposed Handover Authentication Mechanism

Handover Authentication Phase
In this phase, the MS roams to another HBS, and a key pre-distribution method is proposed. After the first HBS1 successfully authenticates a MS through the login authentication phase, HBS1 generates a message that contains , key P 1 using Equation (7). Then HBS1 encrypts the message using the group key K GB , and sends it to its neighbors. Where; (7) The neighbor target base stations TBSx decrypts the message using to get the key P 1 with its corresponding , and calculate as in (Equation 3 ) to prepare for future authentication of the coming MS. In [5] , the HBS1 sends the first byte of the credential ticket as an alternative to to its neighbors . It is not sufficient to determine the exact identity of the MS. This is may lead to a certain conflict in the authentication of the MS with other MSs. So, when the MS enters a new HBS region; HBS 2 for example, MS chooses a new random number then sends a MSG#1 to HBS 2 as a request for connection with HBS 2 and the following handover authentication protocol starts:
MSG#2: → (9)
MSG#3:
→ (10) Clarification of messages 1, 2, and 3:
1) MSG#1 contains the MS's transfer ticket T 0 MS , the random number , the random number , h and their MAC value (MAC using the P 1 key). Note that: The MS can calculate P 1 during its staying in HBS1, before travelling to HBS2 to save time. So, no computation time is consumed for this process.
2) Once HBS2 receives MSG#1, HBS2 starts to authenticate MS as follows:  First step: HBS2 Determines the P 1 key, which it is the corresponding to , then it Computes the MAC function using this P 1 key. If the two values are different, HBS2 will ignore the message. This is a fast check to determine the fault messages, and an efficient method to prevent the denial of service attack. If the sent MAC value equals to the computed MAC value, the protocol will go to the second step. Many other schemes like in [6] don't have a quick tool to differentiate between the fault messages and the correct messages. So In these schemes, the new HBS must complete all the protocol steps' to can differentiate between the right and wrong messages. 3) Upon receiving the MSG#2 from BS 2, MS verifies that the in the MSG#2 matches the value provided by itself in the MSG#1. If the value doesn't match, the MS shall ignore MSG#2 as a fast check like in the previous message. Otherwise, MS uses P 1 to verify the MAC value. If the MAC value is verified, MS considers HBS 2 as a legal HBS and sends MSG#3 to HBS 2 that includes and its MAC value using the P 1 key. 4) Upon receiving MSG#3, HBS 2 repeats the same MAC calculation for .
 If HBS2 obtains the same MAC value as the received one, then HBS2 authenticates the MS. Then, HBS2 Computes a new random number P 2 using P 1 the as in Equation (13). HBS2 starts to prepare a message contains P 2 with its corresponding . The message is symmetrically encrypted using the key, and broadcasts it to all its neighbors as the HBS1 did before, and as each new HBS will behave. (13) In the next section, the performance analysis of the presented scheme is declared.
Performance Analysis
A numerical analysis is presented in this section, and a comparison with other handover authentication protocols, which are the most relevant to ours will be declared [2, 5, and 10] . The main two important parameters to get a good and efficient comparison are as follows:
1. Computation cost: the MS and the HBS consume some time to complete the mutual authentication operation between each other. 2. Communication cost: this is the number and size of messages that are necessary to be transferred between the HBS and the MS to complete the mutual authentication operation. Also, the presented paper is focused on the handoff authentication latency. From [13] , the handoff authentication latency is a part of the handoff latency. We can estimate the handoff authentication latency by adding the computation time and the communication time that are required to complete the mutual authentication.
As shown in Table 1 , the comparison of performance contains computation cost, communication overhead, and the handoff authentication Latency. We used the computation time of the algorithms, which are measured in [14] as listed in Table. 2.
In order to perform the comparison, we denote the hash function as H, the symmetric encryption function as Es, the symmetric decryption function as Ds, the MAC function as Ds, the MAC function as MAC, the truncate operation as Tr, the dot operation as Dot, the public encryption operation as Epub, the public decryption operation as Dpub, the generation of a digital signature as Gsig, the verification of a digital signature as Vsig, the number of hops between the MS and the AS as h, and the average delay of a one-hop transmission caused by a message as d.
We assumed the following assumptions: 1-The computation time of the Dot function is equal to the computation time of the hash function. The Dot16KDF refers to a keyed hash function [15] . 2-From [6] , the truncate function is defined as: Truncate (x,y) = the last y bits of x if and only if y≤ x [6] . So, the computation time of the truncate functi on will be neglected. From Table 1 and 2, we can see that the authentication latency of the EAP-TLS protocol (97.962+9dh) ms, the authentication latency of the proposed protocol in [10] is (4.44+3d) ms, the authentication latency of the previous proposed protocol in [5] is (4.39+3d) ms, and the authentication latency of the proposed protocol is (4.38+3d) ms. So the authentication latency of the proposed handover protocol is less than the schemes presented in [12, 5, and10] . Particularly, the proposed scheme has a clear advantage in computation overhead compared with the existing sc hemes in [12, and10] , since our scheme needs only three messages to complete the handover authentication. The numerical analysis shows the theoretical gain of the proposed protocol over the other existing schemes. In the next section, a security analysis is presented.
Security Analysis
We analyze the security of the proposed protocol with respect to the essential security requirements as follows.
Replay Attack
From Equation (4), we can see that the MS's ticket contains T exp . This parameter includes the expiration time, and the time stamp of this message. The time stamp prevents replay attack. Also, the insider attack will be prevented; the MS can't give his data to another member in the group to send the same message again. Th e insider attack is considered a very difficult attack to be revealed.
Denial of Service Attack
In other schemes [9, and10] , the new HBS must complete all the protocol steps' to can differentiate between the correct and the incorrect messages. The presented scheme has a quick tool to differentiate between them, by a simple MAC function.
Forgery Attack
From Equation (4), using the symmetric encryption in the client's ticket guarantees that the client tickets are protected against forgery attack.
Non_repudiation
In the proposed scheme, the tracing of the MS becomes impossible, because there's no information related to the MS's identity sent during its transferring. So, it was necessary to add any information to help the AS to determine the exact MS which makes bad behaviors if happened. The proposed factor in the presented scheme is the number of hops h. This number increased by one in each hop by the new HBS, and sent to the next HBS inside the sent ticket. So, the AS can get it from the current HBS. Then by applying the hash function number of times equals h to of its members, the AS can determine the intended MS who did these bad behaviors, and take with it the required procedures. The intended MS can't repudiate. As we can see, the non_repudiation property can be satisfied without losing the privacy property. We can describe the idea in more details in as follows:
Once a certain MS makes a bad behavior, the AS makes the following steps to determine its identity:
1. After the initial authentication phase, each MS is recorded in the AS's data base with its corresponding random number , and key P 0 .
2. In each handover authentication phase, the number of hops h, and the new random number is included in the ticket as declared in Equation (12). Where;
is changed according to the number of hops h. So the AS can collect h and that are related to the probable MS's that may make these bad behaviors.
3. Apply the hash function to no of times equal h, and compare the result with the current for each probable MS until determine the intended one. Then, make with him the required action as the revocation from the service with another suitable punishment.
Masquerading
The intruder can't masquerade the legal MS. Because, the corresponding random number of this MS, , which defines the MS's identity is included in the symmetrically encrypted ticket.
The most important security features of the presented protocol compared with other protocols are summarized in Table. 3
Table 1. Comparison of the Most Important Security Features
The scheme proposed in [9] The scheme proposed in [10] The scheme proposed in [5] The proposed The verification of the presented protocol is declared in the next section.
